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Croatia's role and place in the European milieu is
determined by its three main geopolitical dimensions which
define it as a Central European, Mediterranean and
Danubian country. The first of these places Croatia into the
Central European group of countries with whom it has
numerous historical, political and economical linkages. The
second emphasizes that Croatia is also a part of the culturally
diverse and rich Mediterranean basin. Aside from these two
dimensions, Croatia also has access to probably the most
important European river - the Danube.1 These three
geopolitical dimensions of Croatia which orient it towards
Europe, constitute the axes for the fundamental framework
of the philosophy of the Croatian Government in defining
foreign policy actions and setting priorities.
The projects and intentions of the Croatian Government
are, however, only one aspect of the Croatian European story,
the other one, of course, is the European policy towards
Croatia. This paper shall be limited to the policy of the
European Union (EU) which, through its coordinated efforts
within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, is evidently the most coherent European voice.2 If
one was to give an assessment of the EU policy towards
Croatia, the most likelyconclusion would be that it has varied
a great deal with time and the alteration of the overall political
and security situation. Still it may be said that the predominant
approach was characterized by a reluctance of the EU to
adopt an open and welcoming stand towards Croatia.
Moreover, an analysis of relations between Croatia and EU
could lead to the conclusion that the wait-and-see policy
pursued by some European states in regard to Croatia's
admittance to the Council of Europe as well as with
concluding the Cooperation Agreement with the EU, in some
cases, caused Croatia to be at variance with EU policy. No
matter what the intentions were, the European messages did
not prove to be conducive to encouraging the peaceful
reintegration of the occupied parts of Croatia.
Consequently, such a policy urged Croatia to look for
different waysof finding solutions to its most acute problems.
In that context, by far the most significant events for Croatia
were twomilitary operations (Flash and Storm)3 during which
the majority of the former occupied territories were liberated.
These victories, not only enabled Croatia to return fully back
onto its feet, but they also lifted a long lasting siege of one of
the so-called UN safe havens in Bosnia - Bihac, which had
been strangled by the Serbs for over three years." Moreover,
the successes of the Croatian Army as well as the alliance
with the Bosnian Army and Croats in Bosnia created the
conditions for a more even military situation in Bosnia.P In
other words, for the first time after the onset of the war, the
Serbs started to lose the territories they have earlier occupied
and ethnically cleansed. There is no doubt that this
development was a precondition to the peace process and in
fact paved the way for the diplomatic efforts of the Contact
Group in organizing the conference in Dayton which resulted
with the now famous Peace Accords.
In evaluating the period behind it, Croatia can be
satisfied with the fact that it succeeded in acquiring and
exercising sovereignty over most of its territory. This
contentment can also be extended to the ongoing process of
peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian area into
the constitutional and legal system of the state. In that respect,
credit should be given to United Nations Transitional
Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Western Sirmium and
Baranya (UNTAES) and General Jacques Klein, the
Transitional Administrator, who has demonstrated a very high
level of determination in fulfilling the mandate he was given
by the Security Council. Given that the demilitarization of
that part of Croatia has been completed, hopefully the whole
process shall progress quickly and the return of Croatian
refugees will commence shortly, as well as the vast
reconstruction of the area, in particular the city of Vukovar
which suffered the greatest destruction and devastation. In
that sense the full support that the Croatian Government
has given to UNTAES will also contribute to the positive
achievements of the ongoing process and will further protect
the rights and ensure the safety of all Croatian citizens.
There is another important issue that has put a positive
light on Croatia's future in Europe - the decision taken by
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 2
July 1996. This decision means that Croatia has been invited
to become a member of the Council of Europe, upon the
condition that the decision will enter into force during the
second half of September, after the elections in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Croatia shall also have to comply with the list
of21 commitments that was accepted and signed byPresident
Franjo Tudman and President of the Sabor Vlatko Pavletic
on 15 March 1996. Although, almost all European states,
each with their own levels of political and civic development,
are already members of the Council of Europe, Croatia s
path toward this objective has been riddled by many
postponements and thorough examinations of all aspects of
functioning of the state and after having been a special guest
in the organization for four years.f Nevertheless, this decision
should still be regarded as one of the crucial steps forward in
Croatia's attempts to become fully integrated into the Euro-
Atlantic political, economic and security structures. Finally,
despite various views concerning the significance of the
Council of Europe, it must be said, that membership in one
of the oldest European organizations can substantially
contribute to strengthening the development of democracy,
rule of law and the protection of human rights in any country
wishing to become a member. It also seems a lot easier and
more logical to use all the international mechanisms of control
and supervision when a country is in the club rather than
when it is outside it.
2. A review of relations between Croatia and the EU
Amongst multilateral organizations, the EU is
undoubtedly economically the most attractive and financially
the most powerful organization representing an exclusiveclub
of European countries. Becoming a member of this club is
one of the long-term Croatian foreign policy objectives.
Relations with the EU are often the subject of extensive
debates in Croatian political circles and it can be concluded
that there is a vast consensus by all the political parties that a
firm pro-European orientation is not only the most obvious
but also the most natural future scenario for the country.
The path to institutionalized relations with Europe is
not an easy one. On the contrary it is very demanding and
involves serious work and thorough preparations of the state
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administration and institutions. It also encompasses a broad
adjustment of Croatian legislation with the acquis
communautaire and the adoption of numerous technical and
other standards. The implementation of these processes is
itself a very difficult exercise, however, it is even harder
without the proper assistance ofEU institutions. Croatia has
not received the adequate and necessary technical and expert
assistance that would have effectively enabled the realization
of all the tasks that confront any country in transition. Most
of the work on harmonization that has been done so far has
been conducted through the use of Croatian resources.
Despite all the efforts that are being put into achieving the
aims of internal adjustment, there are serious reserves about
the full success and sufficiency of such work. In that respect
Croatia has repeatedly asked for the establishment of closer
ties with the EU, but has not yet witnessed the desired level
of readiness for better cooperation from the other side."
Even though it may seem to have been fairly modest
cooperation, let us take a concise overview of the past and
present relations between Croatia and the EU.
In the period prior to the democratization of the country
Croatia had intense economic cooperation and political
linkages with western European countries. Moreover,
Croatia, as one of the most advanced republics of the former
Yugoslavia, was among the first states in the region of Central
and Eastern Europe that had established relations with the
European Community, as well as trade cooperation with its
members. After the establishment of independence, Croatia
and the EU continued to run their trade relations on the
basis of the decision of the Council of Ministers of the
European Community in December 1991, which granted
Croatia trade quotas with so-called "preferential regimes".
The same decisions were reconfirmed in December 1992and
December 1993. The relations between Croatia and the
European Community during that period can be seen as a
kind of transitional phase of mutual cooperation.
At that time, approximately 40% of total Croatian
exports, worth some US$1.85 billion, were directed to the
European Community market, which amounted to 0.5percent
of the total European Community imports. Impo-rts from
the European Community member countries to Croatia
amounted to approximately US$2 billion. The most important
trading partners were Germany and Italy, covering 75% of
the overall trade with Community.
Therefore, the 1991-93 period could be seen as a period
of "low-level" relations. In that period, most of the political
activities consisted of valuable humanitarian aid and the EU
involvement in the peace process negotiations. Subse-quently,
the Croat-Moslem conflict in Bosnia, the tragic con-flict
between victims of the same aggression over the scarce land
that had not been occupied by Serbs, impacted upon the
relations resulting in the EU freezing its links with Croatia.
In the first quarter of 1994, the Washington Agreement
re-established cooperation between Croats and Moslems in
Bosnia and was actively supported by the Croatian
Government. Its implementation led to a revival" of
encouraging political relations between the EU and Croatia.
The positive trend in the mutual relations continued during
the first half of 1995 when some important decisions
concerning Croatia were taken by the EU. In April the
Council of Ministers of the EU mandated the European
Commission to commence preparations for negotiations on
a Co-operation Agreement. On 27 April the European
Parliament approved the inclusion of the Republic of Croatia
into the PHARE Program. Both decisions became
operational on 12 June 1995.8
In Croatia, the National Co-ordinator for the PHARE
Program and the Chief Negotiator for the Co-operation
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Agreement were appointed.f In addition, the relevant expert
teams were established.l'' Soon after two negotiation rounds
for the Co-operation Agreement were successfully concluded
in Brussels and Zagreb.
Furthermore, the overall legal framework in Croatia
was also being improved and adjusted to European standards.
Legislation, particularly in the commercial field, such as laws
on trade, competition and company law, were adopted on
the basis of the EU legislation. On these issues, Croatia
showed its technical, legal and economic readiness to join
the "pre-accession" framework in order to establish long term
political dialogue with the EU.
All of these efforts were also supported by the positive
effects of the national economic and developmental policy,
whichwere repeatedly confirmed by the IMF and World Bank
experts that have regularly visited Croatia.
However, in the summer of 1995 the Croatian leadership
made a decision to return the occupied territories by using
military and police force after several years of negotiations
had proved fruitless and every opportunity for peaceful
reintegration had been exhausted. This was not easily
accepted bymost of the international community, even though
Croatia had every moral and legal right to establish law and
order on its entire territory. It was with a swiftness rarely
seen that the EU promptly adopted, on 4 August 1995, a
decision to suspend the Co-operation Agreement negotiations
and the implementation of the PHARE Program.
Following this development, Croatian - EU relations
have not improved, but, on the contrary, have taken an
unwanted direction.U Croatia's main concern is aimed at
the EU s new regional approach folicy, some of the effects
of which have already been felt.1
3. The regional approach policy
The regional approach policy was formally laid down in
the conclusions of the Council of Ministers of the EU at its
session of 26 February 1996, and is, in a way, the extension
and further elaboration of the Council of Ministers'
conclusions of 30 October 1995.
The regional approach is constituted of three levels:
cooperation amongst the states of south-east Europe,
cooperation between the states of south-east Europe (in a
narrow sense) and other neighboring countries and, coopera-
tion between the states of the south-east Europe and the EU.
The regional approach is also comprised of the so-called
conditionality policy in regard to the establishment of long-
term relations with the EU. This conditionality ismanifested
through:the implementation of the peace process, respect for
human and minority rights, the right of refugees and displaced
persons to return, respect for the principles of market econo-
my and cooperation with the Hague War Crimes Tribunal.
Finally, the regional approach calls for stability and good
neighborliness in the region: by allegedly contributing to
peace and security, by giving incentives for regional
cooperation, by enhancing and intensifying relations with the
EU and by contributing to the programs of reconstruction.
The process of strengthening stability and good neighborliness
is intended to ease tensions, prevent the renewal of the con-
flict, as well as to restore confidence and establish dialogue.
The Croatian Government is aware of and well
acquainted with the different regional policies of the EU
towards various regions of the world such as the Visegrad
group, the Baltic states, the CIS and so on. Whilst this
approach has been said to be fruitful for some of the countries
in question, in many cases this approach has led to complaints
that it is producing negative effects through its linkage of the
progress of one country with the results of another.13 This is
but one of the reasons why Croatia is sceptical in its
assessment of the regional approach.
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Many people in Croatia become very concerned and
anxious when such ideas of regional cooperation and linkages
are proposed in certain capitals, or in academic circles. This
anxiety is a consequence of what appears to be the hidden
agenda behind the application of the regional approach to
Croatia, that is, the revival of a new Yugoslavia. Most people
do not want to see any form of reconstruction of nor revival
of anything that may resemble Yugoslavia. The reasons are
numerous, but the most obvious are the still fresh memories
of the brutal aggression that took thousands of human lives,
caused massive destruction and set back the development of
the country for many years. These reasons alone are sufficient
to wind up the pulse of public opinion in Croatia, and thus it
is not easy to comprehend the policy of the EU and it is even
more difficult to try accept it on a "take it or leave it" basis.
Croatia cannot accept being forcibly placed into a group
of countries made up exclusively of those that were involved
in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, namely Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and two other
countries that the EU envisaged to include, namely, Macedo-
nia and Albania. The reasons are manifold, ranging from the
most obvious, namely the war time aggression perpetrated
against Croatia to fundamental cultural and historical
differences, and very importantly, the alienation of Croatia
from its major existing and natural economic partner states.
Should Croatia be offered a new text of the Co-operation
Agreement similar to the one that was offered to Macedonia 14
and which includes the famous clauses on unavoidable and
necessary regional cooperation, it must be understood that
its acceptance would lead to somewhat bizarre results. For
example, it is possible that the Croatian trade regime would
then be more liberal towards goods from Yugoslavia than
those from Italy or Germany. The fact that Croatia s historic
and current trade orientation is firmly directed towards west-
ern Europe would make the impact of such a regional appro-
ach upon Croatia unnatural, massive and extremely negative.
The regional approach seems to contradict Article "0"
in Title VII (or the Final Provisions) of the Treaty on the
European Union which constitutes the legal basis for enlarge-
ment and which says: "Any European State may apply to be-
come a Member ofthe Union ...", by imposing additional obli-
gations on a prospective applicant country so that it must not
only fulfill the criteria on its own, but at the same time hope
that its neighbors are also diligent enough to do the same.
How can one explain or interpret the highest EU officials
when they say that the message they send to countries of
south-east Europe is: cooperate among yourselves, if you want
the EU to cooperate with you.15 Particularly when those
countries have not been given a chance to be assessed or
judged on their own merits.
Finally, should Croatia agree to be constantly held
responsible for the implementation of the peace agreement
for Bosnia and Herzegovina and also tied to the development
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in becoming a fully independent
and stable country? This is especially onerous when the policy
of tying countries together does not seem to have been
implemented in the case of Slovenia, a country which has
already concluded the Association Agreement with the Eu.16
All of the above may suggest that the Croatian
Government is paranoid and isolationist. It may suggest that
Croatia is refusing any sort of cooperation with its immediate
neighbors. However that is not true, and the practice and
facts demonstrate something completely different. Croatia
is well aware that the fostering of trade relations with the
countries designated under the regional approach is of great
importance in the overall normalization of relations and
stabilization of the area. However, Croatia s Central Euro-
pean and Mediterranean orientation as well as the institutio-
nalization of relations with the EU on this basis will not lead
to new lines of separation in Europe. On the contrary, because
of this orientation and its bordering with the Balkans, Croatia
sees its interests in achieving peace and stability in that region.
Accordingly; Croatia has been an active participant in the
EU/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Process of Stability and Good Neighborliness in
South-East European states and was also present at the
Ministerial Conference held in Sofia on 6 an 7 July 1996. I7
Furthermore, there are some facts that shed more light
onto the big picture of Croatia's cooperation with its
neighbors. Namely, since independence and international
recognition Croatia has signed 188 bilateral agreements with
European-f countries. 84 of them, or more precisely 45%,
were concluded with close countries in the region: Albania-
11, Austria - 9, Bosnia and Herzegovina -16, Italy - 4, Hungary
- 17, Macedonia - 10 and Slovenia - 17. Many other
agreements are currently being negotiated, while a large
number of agreements that were concluded with the former
SFRY and above mentioned countries have been adopted
by succession to them. Thus for example, there are 105
agreements with Italy, 34 with Hungary, between 60 and 360
with Germany depending on methodology. Croatia has even
signed Agreements with the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)
on consular functions, opening of hifhway, railway, air-traffic,
pipe-line and telecommunications. 9
It is crucial to outline that official visits from the highest
political to expert level are frequently taking place and
Croatia's cooperation with its neighbors on a bilateral basis
is regarded as very positive. Croatia continues to develop
dynamic technological, scientific and other relations through
bilateral co-operation in Europe, particularly with its
neighboring countries. On an economic level, Croatia's
current foreign trade figures show a clear trend oriented
towards Western-European and Central-European countries,
for example, Italy - 20,29%; Slovenia - 11,63%; Austria -
6,38%; B-H - 3,23%; Hungary - 1,89%; Macedonia - 0,87%.
These economic relations are governed by the principles of
the free market economy which playa key role in determining
the political and economic priorities of Croatia.
For all of these reasons one cannot see the need for
such a fixed and inflexible policy on the part of the EU. A lot
more subtleness, tact and fairness is required for a correct
and respectful treatment of the countries in question by the
EU. The establishment of more frequent dialogue should
replace a firm conditionality policy. The placement of Croatia
in the Balkans by external factors would be an alteration of
the geopolitical reality, leading to serious instability, and is,
therefore, unacceptable. The lack of assurance and clear
explanation regarding the EU regional approach has caused
deep concern in Croatia, particularly due to the effects that
this policy has already had upon its process of European
integration.
The Croatian Government believes that there is room
for a solution that would be suitable to both sides and that
would enable Croatia to create solid ground for a frank and
fruitful long-term relationship with the EU. It should be noted
that recent talks between Croatian authorities and the high
officials of the EU have led to a more precise explanation of
the meaning of the regional approach policy which, at least
so far as the rhetoric was concerned, seemed more acceptable
to Croatia.2°
Furthermore, the fact that Croatia is still not a
beneficiary of the PHARE Program and that the negotiations
on the Co-operation Agreement have remained suspended
for almost a year could presently be viewed as a part of the
regional approach. This is likely to create a comparative
difference between the dynamic of development in Croatia
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and the other Central European countries, with the
consequence of alienating Croatia economically from its
principle partners. The creation of a special type of agreement
shall have the effect of institutionally limiting Croatia's
development and politically confining it into the Balkans,
particularly when it is taken into account that the Association
Agreement (Europe Agreement) is also a precondition for
membership of the Central European Free Trade Area
(CEFTA). In that respect, it should be noted that Croatia is
currently in the process of negotiating free trade agreements
with the CEFT A countries and also attaches special
importance to establishing close ties with the European Free
Trade Area.
Croatia and the EU have the same basic interests
regarding the Balkan region, namely, peace, stability and good
neighborly relations amongst states. Croatia has traditional
links with Bosnia and Herzegovina which, through the
framework of political and diplomatic partnership relations
between Croatia and the EU, could well serve in the long
term stabilization of that region.
At the same time, it ought to be clearly said that Croatia
has no objections to any other country in the region regulating
its relations with the EU in whichever way it finds to be most
suitable.
4. Perspectives
Historically, politically, economically, culturally and
geographically Croatia has always been a part of Europe.
Today Croatia is seeking active participation in the process
of European integration because it feels it can contribute to
the overall good of modern European society. For Croatia,
Europe is a symbol of a stable system, of a regulated
framework of societal relations, market economy and
incentive for progressive development and growth.
The sole fact that over 60% of Croatian exports go to
the European Union, already represents a sufficient argument
for thorough and serious preparations in Croatia for
institutionalized cooperation with the largest market in the
1. Thisdimension is sometimes neglected due to the. fact that Croatia was
deprived of having access to the Danube in recent years when that part of
Croatia was under Serbian occupation.
2. The EUpolicy that is shaped through the Common Foreign and Security
Policy or the so-called second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. is impartant.
but is not the sole framework for arranging the external relations of the EU
and thus with Croatia too. Namely, many of the Croatia - EUrelations are of
an economic nature and remain under the umbrella of the so-called first or
EC pillar of the Maastricht Treaty.
3. Operation Flash was carried out in May '95 and involved the liberation of
territories in westem Siavonia. Operation Storm occurred in August '95 and
involved the liberation of previously occupied territory that came to be
constituted by UN Sectors North and South.
4. The UN Security Council resolution SfRESf824 ('93) of 6 May '93 declared
Bihac and five other Bosnian cities (Sarajevo, Iuzlo, Zepa, Gorazde and
Srebrenica) as safe havens. Prior to the operation Storm there was the absurd
situation where the sove haven of smoc was being attacked from the
occupied parts of Croatia declored to be a "UN protected area".
5. Frequent and close consultations between Zagreb and Sarajevo led to
the signing of the Split Declaration on 22 July '95 which provided the basis
for the legal presence and military activities of the Croatian Army forces on
the soil of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As it later became clear, the meeting in Split
actually marked the strategic shift in the balance of power during the entire
five years conflict in the region. From that point on the Serbian military
dominance irretrievably diminished, while the Bosnian and Croat strength
continued to rise.
6. Croatia was given the special guest status with the Council of Europe on
4 May '92, and has subsequently submitted the application for membership
on 11 September '92.
7. Thus for instance Croatia has not been mentioned nor included in the
European Council conclusions in Essen (Dec, '94) and Cannes (June, '95)
regarding the 'White Paper on the Preparation of the Associated Countries
of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into Intemal Market of the Union"
that was prepared by the European Commission.
8. The Council of Ministers decided to include Croatia into the PHAREProgram
and gave the green light to the Europecn Commission to start the negotiations
on the Co-operation Agreement.
9. Appointed were Mr Ziatko Moteso. the present Prime Minister, and at the
time, Minister in charge of relations with international economic and financial
institutuions and Mr Davor Stem, the present Minister of Economy, and at the
time, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs in charge of economic matters.
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world. All of the challenges that are ahead will require a well
organized, equipped and educated state administration for
which the unavoidable precondition is introduction of
European subjects in University education but also the
education and practical training of civilservants in the tertiary
institutions of the EU member states as well as in the
institutions of the ED.
It is true that Croatia has been somewhat delayed in its
development by the aggression which it suffered. Luckily the
worst period is now definitely behind and Croatia is gathering
its energies to be fully capable to join other countries in
transition and also to become a member of such multilateral
organizations such as the Council of Europe, CEFT A, and in
due course, the EU.
Bearing in mind the full complexity of Croatia's
international position it is crucial to state that Croatia fully
supports the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was
created in Washington in 1994. Croatia demonstrated a
constructive attitude in attaining the Dayton Accords and
also provided valuable input during the recent negotiations
on sub-regional arms control.21 Of course, Croatia s particular
attention will be focused on the protection of the rights of
Croats in Bosnia. Hopefully, the Mostar examplewillfacilitate
the elections in September on the entire territory of Bosnia.22
Croatia will continue to seek stability and peace in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
Finally, it is impossible to imagine a united, democratic,
stable and prosperous Europe, from the Atlantic to the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean to the Baltic, with a geopolitical
gap in the south-east of the Continent between Slovenia and
Greece. The only way of filling such a void is by a
comprehensive "Europeanization" of the area. The best
method for achieving this objective is open and frequent
dialogue between Croatia and the EU which will not only
settle mutual relations, but also significantly contribute to
the overall stability of the area.
•
10. All of this was followed by several technical missions of the European
Commission that visited Croatia and expressed positive opinions regarding
the level of "tecbnlcot" readiness of Croatia for the implementation of the
PHARE Program, as well as for the negotiations on the Co-operation
Agreement
11. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the criminal events which were
committed after Operation Storm, although condemned by the Croatian
Government which initiated criminal proceedings against the perpetrators,
severely damaged Croatia's human rights reputation.
12. This policy has also been refered to as the global-regional opprooch,
13. As an illustration, we will only mention the Co-operation Agreement with
Hungary which was presented to the Hungarians as unique and reserved
only for them. Interestingly enough, that agreement later became a model
for almost all other Central and Eastern European states, and one can hardly
say that the Hungarians were thrilled by it.
14. On 20 6 '96 Macedonia initialled a Co-operation Agreement with the EU.
15. These comments were made by the President of the European
Commission Mr Jacques Santer, in his report to the Council of Ministers (10
June '96) after his visit to countries in souht-east Europe on 7 and 8 June '96.
16. Slovenia's Association Agreement with the EUwas signed on 10 June '96.
17. Croatia was represented by its Ambassador to Bulgaria.
18. Data accurate on 1 July '96.
19. These agreements were signed on 11 March '96 in Zagreb between
Ministers of Foreign Affairs Dr. Mate Granic and Mr Milan Milutinovic, as well
as the Ministers of Transport and Communications Mr. Zeljko tuzovec and
Dr. Zaran vulovlc. Their signing represented a major breakthrough in the
process of normalization of the bilateral relations between Croatia and FRY
after the Dayton Agreement.
20. A frank exchange of views between Croatia'S Foreign Minister Dr. Granic
and the new President of the Council of Ministers Mr. Spring and European
Commissioner Mr. van den Broek toak place during their visit to Zagreb on
11 July '96.
21. The Agreement on SUb-Regional Arms Control was signed in Florence
pursuant to Annex 1B of the Dayton Accords on 14 June '96 after six months
of negotiations in Vienna under the auspices of the OSCE.
22. The EU s involvement in Mostor through its CFSP Joint Action (EU
Administration of Mostar) is undoubtedly amongst the most significant foreign
policy ventures of the EU, and represents a big challenge for the credibility
of the Union. In this respect, the Republic of Croatia is providing continued
support to the EUs efforts.
